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Introduction
Indigenous relations with land are grounded in place-based legal orders which have been
regulating the territories now making up Canada for millennia (Borrows 2010, 2018; McGregor
2010). Judicial consideration of Indigenous relations with place has focused on the duty to
consult and accommodate with respect to ‘Crown land’ – lands for which federal and provincial
governments are the deemed owners. This emphasis on Crown lands is logical – 89 per cent of
land in Canada is held by either the federal or provincial Crown (Neimanis 2013). Indigenous
claims often expressly exclude private land, wary of courts’ willingness to unsettle third-party
expectations, and conscious of relationships with neighbours (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British
Columbia, 2014 SCC 44). However, this emphasis has come at the expense of attention to
Indigenous property relations in areas that have been largely privatized. The creation of fee
simple lands from Indigenous territories has had a disproportionate impact on particular nations.
For example, in heavily populated southern areas the majority of Indigenous lands are now
owned by third parties and therefore excluded from modern treaty settlement or other land claims
processes (Reynolds 2018). Private lands are also largely controlled by the ‘agenda’ of the
private owner (Katz 2008; Van Wagner 2017).
This chapter explores the relationship between Indigenous environmental jurisdiction –
the authority to make decisions about the land – and fee simple property. In Canada’s inherited
tenurial system the Crown holds the radical title to all land. A fee simple estate is the legal
mechanism through which private ownership of land is made possible, subject to the Crown’s
radical title. This structure of property law has profound implications for Crown–Indigenous
relations. Using case studies from British Columbia and Ontario, this chapter examines how the
Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples has been applied to private land.
Theoretically the duty ensures the Crown does not ‘run roughshod’ over Indigenous interests
(Haida Nation v. British Columbia [Minister of Forests], 2004 SCC 73, para. 27). Yet in practice
the duty allows courts to avoid confronting difficult questions about the relationship between
Indigenous jurisdiction and private property.
Much emphasis has been placed on the ‘innocent’ third-party interests of those now in
possession of fee simple lands (Hamilton 2018; Lavoie 2017; McNeil 2001, 2010; Slattery 2006;
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) [2000], 51 OR [3d] 641). As Gordon
Christie (2009, p. 191) argues, the predominant judicial response has been ‘allaying the fears of
private property owners’. Courts avoid complicated and uncomfortable questions by presuming
such interests extinguish Indigenous relations with place (Borrows 2015a; Christie 2009). But
where land use decisions implicate Indigenous relations with lands and waters, Indigenous
interests cannot be presumed to be subsumed by fee simple title. As John Borrows (2015a, p.
117) notes, such a presumption distorts the Canadian constitution by privileging non1

constitutional private property interests over constitutionally protected Indigenous interests.
Financial compensation may be a necessary element of Canadians taking collective
responsibility and bearing the cost of righting wrongs against Indigenous peoples (McNeil 2010,
p. 25). However, it is an insufficient remedy for dispossession and the consequences flowing
therefrom. Rather, we must find ways to restore Indigenous relations with land and territory.
Engagement with Indigenous environmental jurisdiction as a source of land use decision-making
authority is one place to start.
A meaningful shift towards the recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction requires moving
beyond consultation in Canadian law. This will challenge foundational elements of settlercolonial property relations. Yet, it is a critical opportunity ‘to consider the kinds of
transformation of the self and our relations with one another that are a precondition for wider
social and political transformation’ (Bhandar 2018, p. 191). Indeed, place-based Indigenous land
use law and systems of governance offer tools and methods for engagement with the
overlapping, and at times conflicting, relationships with and obligations to particular places in an
era of ecological crisis (Borrows 2010, 2018; McGregor 2010; Mills 2016; Mills et al. 2017).

Background: placing law on private land: consultation stories
Like all conflicts about resource extraction, the cases examined below sit in particular
places constituted by complex relations between the human and more-than-human. As two of the
only cases in which the application of the duty to consult to private land has been considered in
any detail by Canadian courts, they demonstrate how conceptions and practices of consultation
facilitate the ongoing work of dispossession and colonization in Canada. At the same time, they
illustrate the assertion of enduring Indigenous relations with land and legal orders.
THE ESQUIMAULT AND NANAIMO RAILWAY LANDS: BRITISH COLUMBIA’S
‘PRIVATE’ FORESTS
Vancouver Island sits on the far west coast of the lands that now make up Canada. Towering
Douglas Firs populate temperate rainforests brushing up against the Pacific Ocean. Coast Salish,
Nuu-chah-nulth, and Kwakwakaw’akw peoples have lived there for thousands of years. After the
onset of British settlement in the late nineteenth century, the government of Canada awarded the
Esquimalt & Nanaimo (E & N) Railway Company a series of land grants, converting
approximately 20 per cent of Vancouver Island, unceded and collectively held Indigenous
territory, into a vast stretch of private land (Egan 2012; Thom 2014). No consent was ever sought
or given by any of the impacted Indigenous nations. No compensation was offered. The grant
itself is silent on the Indigenous title to the land (Egan 2012; Morales 2014).
Much of the granted land is now owned by public-sector pension plans as ‘private
managed forest lands’ under the British Columbia Private Managed Forest Lands Act (Ekers
2019). Yet, the lands remain subject to ongoing treaty negotiations between the Crown and both
the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group and the Hupacasath First Nation. Officially, the British
Columbia treaty process excludes private land unless a landowner is willing to sell and a First
Nation is willing to purchase it (Reynolds 2018). Nonetheless, Indigenous communities continue
to assert claims in relation to the E & N lands, challenging not only title, but also access and use
of the lands, and environmental oversight (Thom 2014; Egan 2012; Hupacasath First Nation v.
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British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 1712). Indeed, intensive private forestry operations are a source
of significant conflict between Indigenous nations, the Crown, and the private owners (Ekers et
al. 2020).
Robert Morales, chief negotiator for the Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group, describes the
grants, which privatized 85 per cent of Hul’qumi’num lands, as the ‘great land grab’ (Morales
n.d.). Today, private forestry companies hold 60 per cent of Hul’qumi’num territory. Another
large portion of the E & N grant area is in Nuu-chah-nulth territory, specifically one-third of the
lands of the Hupacasath First Nation near Port Alberni. Former Hupacasath chief and now
president of the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, Dr Judith Sayers describes the importance of the
fee simple lands to the Hupacasath:
Our culture as Hupacasath comes from our relationship to the land. Our language comes from the land, our
place names describe what is on the land, the sound the animals make or what animals do. The material for
our homes, longhouses, our canoes, our regalia, our art and some of our clothing comes from forest
ecosystems. The forests cradle the very watersheds that make viable streams for our salmon which are the
mainstay of our diet. (Affidavit #2 of Judith Sayers, para. 3)

Both communities have consistently challenged the conversion of their territory into private land.
A group of Hul’qumi’num nations have taken their case to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v. Canada, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 105/09).
Cowichan Tribes, the largest Hul’qumi’num First Nation, also successfully upheld pest
management conditions in their territory (Timberwest v. Deputy Administrator, [2003] 2002PES-008[a]). In both venues, Hul’qumi’num communities have clearly asserted claims to the fee
simple lands based on their property relations. Yet, in the face of asserted title and advanced
treaty negotiations, private landowners have continued aggressively harvesting Hul’qumi’num
territory with impunity (Ekers et al. 2020).
The legacy of the E & N grants resurfaced in 2003 when the province deregulated
forestry on private land through the industry-driven, voluntary Private Managed Forest Land
Act. While forestry operations on private lands had historically been regulated alongside Crown
lands, private lands could now be ‘removed’ from the public regime (Forests Act, RSBC 1996, c
157). The result would be increased harvesting and log exports, reduced environmental
oversight, and the loss of access for, and consultation with, Indigenous communities (Ekers et al.
2020; Parfitt 2008). Where the lands had once been protected from sale or residential
development, they became primarily an asset in a pension portfolio to be put to the highest and
best use (Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v. British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1505, para. 2). When the government
approved the removal of Hupacasath land from the former regime without consultation, the First
Nation sought judicial review (Hupacasath). Then chief, Dr Judith Sayers described the removal
decision in stark terms, ‘[it] allows Weyerhaeuser to do anything they want on one third of our
Territory’ (Affidavit #2 of Judith Sayers, para. 26).
EXTRACTING THE PENINSULA: TREATY RELATIONS IN ONTARIO’S GREAT LAKES
COUNTRY
The Saugeen (Bruce) Peninsula follows the UNESCO-designated Niagara Escarpment as
it travels north along the shores of Lake Huron and Georgian Bay in the province of Ontario.
These are the territories of the Saugeen First Nation and the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded
First Nation, who together make up the Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON) (Saugeen First Nation
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v. Ontario (MNRF), 2017 ONSC 3456, paras. 36–8). The SON communities are part of the
larger Anishinabek nation whose territory extends throughout the Great Lakes region of North
America. The people of SON have governed and cared for these lands and the adjacent areas for
thousands of years (The Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation, 2005, pp. 3–4). SON has
consistently asserted their jurisdiction over these lands and resources in the face of pressures
from settlement. However, after a series of treaties beginning in the mid-1830s, the vast majority
of SON territory was transformed into a mix of Crown, municipal, and private land.
Questionable treaty negotiations and broken treaty promises are the subject of ongoing litigation
(Opening Statement of the Plaintiff, paras. 30–6). As discussed above, lands held by bona fide
purchasers for value without notice are excluded from the claim (para. 35).
SON territory continues to be under pressure, now also from mining of the peninsula’s
valuable limestone (Saugeen, para. 65; Ritchie 2013). SON’s Environment Office, which
manages consultation for the communities, has developed a detailed Consultation Process and
Protocol for proponents seeking to work within their territories. It states, ‘the full expression of
SON’s rights depends on healthy, biologically diverse ecosystems’ and requires proposed
projects to be ‘consistent with the SON’s vision for the land and waters of their traditional
territories, respectful of their rights and interests and it must contribute to the cultural, economic,
and social vitality of the people’. The Process sets out detailed steps for working with SON.
SON’s assertion of land use jurisdiction flows from a complex web of relationships with, and
responsibilities to care for, the more-than-human world of their territory (Borrows 1997, 2010;
Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation 2005).
In spite of this clear assertion and process, the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Forestry provided SON with no notice of a 2008 application for a limestone quarry for three and
a half years, and ultimately approved the license without consultation (Saugeen, para. 6). The
quarry proposed by the landowner, T & P Hayes Ltd., would be one of around 500 quarries in
SON traditional territory, the cumulative effects of which SON has consistently raised with the
Crown (Chiefs and Council Saugeen Ojibway Nation 2012; Ritchie 2013; Saugeen, para. 46).
The consultation process had been characterized by Crown failures to communicate, unexplained
reversals of position, a lack of funding, unsuccessful attempts at delegation to the private
proponent, and a general unwillingness to meaningfully engage with SON. In their application to
quash the license SON expressly asserted their ‘right to protect the health and integrity of the
lands, waters and resources throughout SON’s traditional territories’ (Saugeen, para. 40).
Discussion
SEARCHING FOR INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL JURISDICTION IN CANADIAN
LAW
Indigenous relations with land are formally protected by s 35 of the Canadian
Constitution, which recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal rights and title (Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 [UK], c 11). The treatment of Indigenous legal
orders and jurisdiction in Canadian law, however, remains very unsettled and continues to be
subject to legal and non-legal challenges (King and Pasternak 2019). The Supreme Court has
clearly rooted recognition of Aboriginal rights and title in pre-existing Indigenous systems of
regulation of use, access to, and ownership of lands, waters, and resources (Borrows 2010; see R
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v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010;
Mitchell v. MNR, 2001 SCC 33, para. 10; Tsilhqot’in Nation, paras. 12, 16). For example,
establishing Aboriginal title requires an Indigenous nation to establish historical occupation,
evidence of which is found in the pre-existing systems of governance demonstrating control or
exclusive stewardship over the land (Tsilhqot’in Nation, para. 38). However, the cases fall short
of recognizing the link between title and governance, leaving a crucial gap in the colonial
conception of Indigenous relations with land (Borrows 2015b; Christie 2015). Further, as Andree
Boisselle (2015, p. 34) argues, the Supreme Court has consistently treated the common law ‘as
law’ and the Aboriginal perspective as ‘factual context relevant to determining whether or not
the legal standard has been met’. For example, while Indigenous systems of land title may be
evidence of occupation, the content of Aboriginal title, and its limitations, are defined in relation
to common law understandings of property. Thus, the Supreme Court specifically requires
occupation to have been ‘exclusive’, centring the right to exclude at the heart of common law
property relations rather than relevant Indigenous concepts about relations with land (Bhandar
2018, p. 65).
The failure to treat Indigenous law as law and to recognize the jurisdictional element of
relations with land is intimately connected with the unquestioned acceptance of Crown
sovereignty and underlying title by Canadian courts (Bhandar 2018; Borrows 2015b; Macklem
2001; McNeil 2018). Irrespective of the Supreme Court’s 2014 declaration that terra nullius
never applied in Canada, and seemingly in contradiction to the recognition of prior Indigenous
occupation and sovereignty, the Crown’s radical title in Canada is repeatedly affirmed in s 35
jurisprudence (see for example, Tsilhqot’in, 69). As the court pronounced early in its engagement
with s 35, ‘there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and
indeed underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown’ (R v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, p.
1103). This unquestioned colonial legal fiction vests ‘extraordinary proprietary power in the
Crown’ and produces significant distortions in how the Crown and third parties engage with
Indigenous relations with land through Canadian law (Macklem 2001, p. 93). As Borrows
(2015b, p. 724) succinctly states, ‘[t]his fraud radically dispossess each original owner’. It lays
the foundation for a narrow view of both the relationship between Indigenous parties and fee
simple lands and Crown obligations in the context of private property. Indeed, it is what Brenna
Bhandar (2018, p. 74) refers to as the ‘mythic foundation’ on which the colonial production of
private land relies. Across Canada, as Patrick Macklem (2001, p. 93) argues, the Crown’s radical
title provided the freedom required to ‘grant third-party interests to whomever it pleased, which
it did: to settlers, mining companies, forestry companies, and others’.
Establishing title is a long and expensive process – indeed only one First Nation has
successfully done so through the courts, and few have navigated the modern-day treaty process
outside of the northern territories. In this context, the duty to consult has become a primary
window through which the Canadian legal system interprets Indigenous relationships to their
broader territories even where rights and title remain ‘unsettled’ in Canadian law (Christie 2019,
p. 113). Therefore, the duty to consult cases are a logical place to look for recognition of
Indigenous environmental jurisdiction in Canadian law. However, the context of private land has
had very limited treatment by the courts – the s 35 case law thus far has been guided by ‘a
visceral driven need to protect private property from any challenge posed by Aboriginal title’
(Christie 2009, p. 197). The following section considers how the courts understand the role of
First Nations in decisions about private land through analysis of the two case studies outlined
above. Rather than working towards the restoration of Indigenous peoples’ relations with their
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broader territory, the application of the duty to private land compounds the radical dispossession
affected by Crown sovereignty. Fee simple lands are understood as effectively severed from the
place-based relations and obligations of Indigenous legal orders.
THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE
The duty to consult and accommodate is rooted in what the Supreme Court has described
as the ‘honour of the Crown’ (Haida, para. 16; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British
Columbia [Project Assessment Director], 2004 SCC 74, para. 24). This constitutional principle
arises from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty in the face of Indigenous peoples’ pre-existing
occupation and requires the Crown to act honourably in all of its dealings with Indigenous
peoples (Haida, para. 27; Taku, para. 24). The Crown must engage in consultation and be
prepared to accommodate Indigenous interests prior to making decisions or allowing impactful
activities on Indigenous territories (Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada [Minister of Canadian
Heritage], 2005 SCC 69, para. 67). This duty arises whenever the Crown has real or constructive
knowledge of a proven or credible, potential Aboriginal right or title claim, and contemplates
acting in a way that may adversely impact that right or title (Haida, paras. 35, 37; Taku, para.
25). These elements are, however, complicated in the context of fee simple lands. What is a
‘credible’ claim to land for which another holds title? When does the Crown take action with
respect to private land? What is an ‘appreciable’ impact on ‘the future exercise of the right itself’
if the land is understood as having already been transformed into private property and the owner
is entitled to exclude all others (Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC
43, para. 46)?
In Anglo-Canadian property law, the fee simple is the largest estate in land, limited only
by the Crown’s underlying title. Relying on this and the centrality of the right to exclude in
common law property (Katz 2008; Merrill 1998), both the Crown and the fee simple title holders
argue the duty simply does not apply on fee simple lands (Hupacasath, para. 165; Saugeen,
paras. 30, 63). This position was accepted without authority or detailed reasons by the Alberta
Court of Appeal in Paul First Nation v. Parkland (County) (2006 ABCA 128). Lower courts and
tribunals in other jurisdictions, including those in the case studies outlined here, have not fully
adopted this position (Timberwest, p. 40; Hupacasath, para. 199; Saugeen, para. 8). However,
even where the duty is found to have been triggered, its application both affirms Crown
sovereignty and upholds the power of the property relations flowing from Crown title.
Indigenous environmental jurisdiction and the relationships it upholds are placed outside the
frame of legal relevance (Blomley 2014). At best, Indigenous relations with place provide
context for the scope of a procedural duty to consult rather than grounding enforceable decisionmaking authority or interests in land (Collins and Sossin 2019, p. 335).
TRIGGERING THE DUTY ON PRIVATE LAND
In Hupacasath, the Crown and the landowner argued the duty could not arise because the
Hupacasath claim to title was ‘fundamentally incompatible’ with fee simple and therefore not
‘credible’ (Hupacasath, paras. 155–6, 167). The Hupacasath claim was ‘not realizable’ because
fee simple interests would necessarily be prioritized even if challenged directly (Hupacasath,
paras. 157, 160). The Crown went so far as arguing application of the duty would ‘constitute a
step towards a challenge to the entire Torrens property system’ (Hupacasath, para. 166). The
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Court rejected this argument, finding ‘[t]he Crown’s honour does not exist only when the Crown
is a land-owner’; however, the judge noted the case presented ‘unique circumstances’
(Hupacasath, paras. 199–200). The unique circumstances, according to the court, arose from the
Crown’s past ‘specific and significant control over activities on the land’ under the Forests Act
rather than from the Crown’s power to make land use policy and decisions more generally. The
public character of the E & N lands was not inherent. Rather, as a Ministerial Briefing Note
described, the removal lands had simply been managed ‘as if’ they were public. The impact of
the removal was to return them to ‘the private lands they have always been’ (Ministry of Forests
2004). In other words, the Crown would step back and the owner would be restored as the
primary decision maker. The pre-existing title to the lands, the ongoing treaty negotiations with
the Crown, were effectively erased.
At the time of the SON hearing, the Crown conceded that the duty was triggered
(Saugeen, para. 137). Therefore, the court did not have to grapple with the question as it did in
Hupacasath. However, the facts make it clear that at key moments the Crown’s position had
been that there was no duty on private lands. The court concludes from the Crown’s initial
response to SON’s request for consultation: ‘The premise of this letter is that MNRF did not
consider that consultation with SON was required because the Project is not on Crown lands’
(Saugeen, para. 63). The Crown viewed SON’s relationship to the land as tenuous at best, with
any obligation fulfilled by a cursory review and deference to the proponent’s assessment of the
impacts and accommodation (Saugeen, paras. 111, 120). Further, while the Crown attempted to
delegate the consultation process to T & P Hayes, ‘it is absolutely clear that Hayes wanted
nothing to do with direct dealings with SON’ (Saugeen, para. 120). Nonetheless, the Crown
proceeded to approve the licence without consultation, and in explicit reliance on Hayes’
engagement with SON, which never actually happened.
THE CONTENT OF THE DUTY: CHARACTERIZING RELATIONS WITH LAND
The Supreme Court has characterized the scope of the duty along a spectrum. The
stronger the claim and the more serious the possible impacts, the more significant the
consultation and accommodation must be (Haida, para. 39). Regardless of where the duty lies on
the spectrum, the duty requires that the Crown act honourably and with integrity, and engage in
meaningful, good faith consultation ‘with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns’
of the Indigenous group (Delgamuukw; Haida, paras. 19, 42). Therefore, a crucial element is the
characterization of the parties’ relations with the land at stake.
In challenging the E & N removal decisions, Dr Sayers’ emphasized the connection
between the land and the Hupacasath language, culture, and way of life: ‘As the Hupacasath, we
continue to assert and exercise our aboriginal rights throughout our Territory and have done so
since before contact with Europeans … The present exercise of our rights and title includes
active participation and management of activities occurring on our Territory’ (Hupacasath,
Affidavit #2 of Judith Sayers, para. 3). This contrasts starkly with the position of the Crown and
landowner who characterized Hupacasath access and use of the land as ‘at the sufferance of the
private land owner, which can at any time prohibit access to its private property’ including by
putting the land to visibly incompatible use, such as commercial logging (para. 165, see R v.
Badger, [1996] SCR 771, para. 66 and R v. Alphonse, [1993] 80 BCLR [2d] 17 [CA]). Further,
the Crown and landowner argued, the government’s treaty negotiations policy expressly excludes
private land – therefore, the Hupacasath title could and would never be realized.
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The court’s characterization of the Hupacasath relationship with the E & N lands
effectively accepted this characterization. In doing so, it produced much the same substantive
result as if the duty had not been applied at all (Hupacasath, para. 200). The judge characterized
Hupacasath rights as ‘at best highly attenuated’. Their title ‘if it has not been extinguished seems
very unlikely to result in obtaining exclusive possession of the Removed Lands in the future’
(Hupacasath, para. 249). Even though the Court concluded the Crown had ‘relinquished its
ability to protect unproven aboriginal claims and the integrity of the Treaty process’ and
recognized potentially significant adverse effects on Indigenous interests, including reduced
access, less oversight, increased extraction, and even sale, it also deemed the duty to consult to
be minimal (Hupacasath, para. 223). The Hupacasath were left with few, if any safeguards for
their asserted constitutional rights. Indeed, just three years later they were back in court, locked
out of the territory, unable to access sacred sites and care for the land (Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, para. 120).
Analysis of public harvesting data reveals the private forestland owners continue to harvest
timber at unsustainable rates, extracting tremendous value from the E & N lands (Ekers et al.
2020).
At the time of the judicial review, the ownership of the land had shifted from a large
integrated forestry company to an asset management company, Brascan (later renamed
Brookfield and sold to two large Canadian public pension funds). Brascan told the court the
reduced oversight and management under the deregulated regime was crucial to their decision to
acquire the lands (Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, para. 59). If the removal decision was quashed, they argued,
‘the value of the Brascan purchase … would be seriously impacted by such an outcome’ (KeKin-Is-Uqs, para. 309). Brascan’s evidence that it would lead them to ‘reassess and reconfigure
its business plans … possibly leading to reduced production and job losses’ led the court to
conclude ‘there would be significant prejudice’ to the landowners if the removal decision were
set aside or delayed. The Hupacasath would suffer ‘lesser prejudice’ (Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, paras. 311,
314). The court provided no explanation for why the loss of access to territory and the inability
to safeguard sacred sites and ecological integrity was the lesser prejudice. The economic
relationship to the land was upheld, as was the Crown’s ability to relinquish its power to govern
fee simple lands subject to unsettled Indigenous claims. Hupacasath relations were presumed to
be severed – first by the unilateral Crown grant of their lands to the E & N, and then by the
Crown’s unilateral policy to exclude fee simple lands from treaty negotiations. When the matter
returned to court in 2008, the owner argued the court could and should not order further
consultation because ‘as a private landowner [it] has a legitimate expectation that it will have
quiet enjoyment of its land’ and not be subject to the exercise of ‘any aboriginal rights or
interests’ (Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, paras. 198–200). The court agreed, interpreting its own power
narrowly to avoid disrupting private property relations and rejecting the possibility that title
holders could be held to have relationships and obligations to the original holders of fee simple
lands.
On the surface, the SON decision provides somewhat of a contrast to that of the
Hupacasath. While neither the project lands nor the surrounding lands are subject to a title claim,
and the territory is covered by a historic treaty, there was no serious dispute before the court that
SON was owed a duty to consult and accommodate. Indeed, the court explicitly recognizes the
ongoing nature of treaty relations and enduring requirement that the Crown act honourably in its
dealings with SON territories (Saugeen, para. 21). Indeed, while the court sympathetically speaks
about the impact on the proponent, they do not hesitate to quash the licence approval. Yet,
ultimately the primacy of the private landowner is left undisturbed by the decision’s failure to
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take up SON’s broader jurisdictional claim. T & P Hayes wanted to go about its business,
according to the court, and as long as the Crown follows through with its own consultation
process, it is free to do so without any engagement with SON.
SON asserted both specific rights to hunt, fish, and gather medicines, as well as a broader
right to fulfil their obligations ‘to protect the health and integrity of lands, waters and resources
throughout SON’s traditional territories’ (Saugeen, paras. 38, 40). This jurisdictional assertion
was an opportunity for the court to meaningfully engage with SON’s relations with, and
obligations to, the territories – to take up Christie’s invitation to enter into ‘dialogue with
particular people in particular places’ affected by Crown grants to third parties (Christie 2009, p.
202). This is consistent with an Anishinaabe understanding of the treaties entered by SON’s
ancestors with the Crown as ‘sacred agreements that brought newcomers into the existing
relationship the Anishinaabe had with all of the creation’ (Restoule v. Canada, 2018 ONSC
7701, para. 414). As legal scholar and SON community member Borrows (2018, p. 63) argues,
‘Treaties must be seen as rooted in particular environments with the goal of sustainably using
ecosystems in ways that preserve, Indigenous land-based life’. Treaties reserved ‘every power of
governance, and every resource not explicitly given to the government’, he argues, including,
‘the right and freedom to act in accordance with their environmental stewardships’.
Yet we see none of this in the SON decision. Rather, we see the court reinforce the duty
to consult as a unilateral Crown-designed, Crown-implemented, and Crown-determined process
(Saugeen, para. 125). The ‘ongoing building of relationships’ and ‘meaningful conversations’
envisioned by the court exclude the very relations with place central to SON’s legal order and
way of life. The only attention to SON’s jurisdictional claim is a two-sentence paragraph
entitled, ‘SON’s Alleged Interest in General Environmental Stewardship’ in which they set it
aside: ‘This decision does not decide whether this alleged interest is a basis on which the Crown
is required to consult SON in respect to the Project’ (Saugeen, para. 153).
The court refuses to engage with SON’s jurisdictional claim. Where it could have opened
the door to legal creativity and dialogue about how these broader relations with place intersect
with the honour of the Crown and the treaty relationship, the court chooses to leave it aside. In
doing so they implicitly uphold the Crown’s understanding of the treaties as land cessions rather
than an agreement to share and care for the land. This choice sends a clear message to both the
Crown and private landowners about whose relations with place matter in Canadian law. As
Linda Collins and Lorne Sossin argue, it seems Indigenous perspectives on ‘environmental
protection and ecological sustainability will play no role in elaborating the obligations under
section 35’ (Collins and Sossin 2019, p. 335). Outside of the kind of egregious Crown failures
where consultation ‘went sideways’, the relations to SON’s territory continue to be
presumptively determined by the intersection of third-party interests and Crown-controlled and designed consultation (Saugeen, para. 160).
Conclusion: a Crown process and nothing more?
In an imagined dialogue with Indigenous nations about the private interests in their
territories, Gordon Christie suggests we listen to how the original owners of the land understood
the encroachment by the new arrivals onto their land (2009, p. 203):
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It might be, for example, that they were open to the notion of sharing, of living on these lands in a
respectful and peaceful relationship with the newcomers. Perhaps they imagined that while each society or
nation would manage its own internal affairs together they would work out a way of sharing the physical
space they would come to co-inhabit, an arrangement that would preserve key elements of group autonomy
while allowing for a process whereby important decisions about shared land use were arrived at between
two societies.

In Canada, s 35-driven consultation has failed to be a space for such a dialogue. In both cases
examined here the duty to consult is found to apply in the context of private land. This is
undeniably important for the First Nations involved. These decisions provide an opening to push
back against the presumptive reasoning applied by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Paul First
Nation. Yet they nonetheless lay bare the limitations of the duty as a tool to facilitate a shift
towards shared, or even Indigenous-led decision making.
The Hupacasath claimants were granted declaratory relief affirming that consultation was
required; however, the removal decision was nonetheless upheld. The owners could now ‘do
anything they want’ on Hupacasath land. When the parties were back before the judge just three
years later without satisfactory accommodation for the Hupacasath, the court sent the parties for
mediation (Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, para. 255). Citing a narrow view of its own jurisdiction, the court
declined to impose even temporary obligations on the private landowner. The court accepted the
owner’s assertion that doing so would set an ‘extraordinary precedent for private landowners’
(Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs, para. 199). The Hupacasath’s relations to their territory were excluded from the
property relations recognized in Canadian law – without any cession or surrender and in the
midst of treaty negotiations.
SON did succeed in having T & P Hayes’ licence quashed. The process was sent back to
the minister, with the Crown required to provide some funding towards SON’s participation.
Indeed, the court makes a crucial observation about the requirement for funding – SON should
not have to use its limited resources for consultation costs for a project that is for third-party
benefit (Saugeen, para. 159). Yet in the same paragraph, the decision underscores the limitations
of the duty to consult: ‘[SON] does not participate in the process as a party to the Project. The
expense of consultation arises as a result of a proponent’s desire to pursue a project, usually for
gain, and the Crown’s desire to see the project move ahead’ (Saugeen, para. 159). Even with the
application remitted, there is no change to the property relations involved. The proponent seeks
authorization to extract benefit from their property without regard to SON’s relations with the
land. The Crown seeks to authorize extraction and can do so as the sovereign decision maker.
SON is neither a beneficiary of the project, nor is it a decision maker. While the Crown is held to
account for repudiating its own process and failing to replace it with another, the court
concludes: ‘The failure of the Crown, in this case, is primarily a failure to follow its own
processes’ (Saugeen, para. 124). In requiring funding for SON’s participation, the court
emphasizes that it is doing no more than ‘find[ing] that the Crown is obliged to keep its word’
(Saugeen, para. 127). The Crown is obliged to go back and implement a process and follow it
through, ‘and nothing more’ (Saugeen, para. 144). SON’s duties and obligations to their
territories, their Process and Protocols upholding their relations with the land, are neither
mentioned nor incorporated into future processes.
There are glimpses of other ways of engaging with Indigenous relations with land
through Canadian law. In a recent trial decision interpreting another treaty in Anishinaabe Great
Lakes country, Restoule, the judge described her task as finding an interpretation that ‘holds the
parties in relationship, looking toward the future together’ (para. 465). Could the duty to consult
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also be interpreted generously and creatively to hold the parties, including fee simple title
holders, in relationship with each other and the land? Can consultation ever create spaces for the
reimagining of property relations in particular places through ‘truly inter-societal
understandings’ and ‘reasoned, open, unconstrained and principled dialogue’ (Christie 2009, pp.
203–4)? Such radical reimagining will undoubtedly impact our understanding of private property
in order to see how it can co-exist with, and within, the enduring environmental jurisdiction of
Indigenous nations. Perhaps this is just the shift in perspective we require to take up Borrows’
call to work towards our ‘collective reconciliation with the earth’ (Borrows 2018, p. 69).
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